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The Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) launched with the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter 
(LRO) on June 18, 2009. While the science purpose of the LCROSS mission was to determine the presence of water-
ice in a permanently-shadowed crater on the moon, the functional purpose was to be a pioneer for future low-cost, 
risk-tolerant small satellite NASA missions. Recent strategic changes at the Agency level have only furthered the 
importance of small satellite missions. NASA Ames Research Center and its industry partner, Northrop-Grumman, 
initiated this spacecraft project two-years after its co-manifest mission had started, with less than one-fifth the 
budget. With a $79M total cost cap (including operations and reserves) and 31-months until launch, LCROSS needed 
a game-changing approach to be successful. At the LCROSS Confirmation Review, the ESMD Associate 
Administrator asked the Project team to keep a close record of lessons learned through the course of the mission and 
share their findings with the Agency at the end of the mission. This paper summarizes the Project, the mission, its 
risk position, and some of the more notable lessons learned. 
 
 
I. THE LCROSS MISSION PROOSAL 
Early in 2006, the NASA Exploration Systems 
Mission Directorate (ESMD) held a competition for 
NASA Centers to propose innovative ideas for a 
secondary payload mission to launch with the Lunar 
Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) to the Moon. The 
successful proposal could cost no more than $80 million 
dollars (less was preferred), would have to be ready to 
launch with the LRO in 31 months, could weigh no 
more than 1000 kg (fuelled), and would be designated a 
risk-tolerant “Class D” mission. In effect, NASA was 
offering a fixed-price contract to the winning NASA 
team to stay within a cost and schedule cap by accepting 
an unusually elevated risk position. 
To address this Announcement of Opportunity to 
develop a cost-and-schedule-capped secondary payload 
mission to fly with LRO, NASA Ames Research Center 
(ARC) in Moffett Field, CA, USA embarked on a 
brainstorming effort termed “Blue Ice” in which a small 
team was asked to explore a number of mission 
scenarios that might have a good chance for success and 
still fit within the stated programmatic constraints. From 
this work, ARC developed and submitted six of the 
nineteen mission proposals received by ESMD from 
throughout the Agency, one of which was LCROSS - a 
collaborative effort between ARC and its industrial 
partner, Northrop-Grumman (NG) in Redondo Beach, 
CA, USA.  
In the LCROSS proposal, ARC would manage the 
mission, perform systems engineering and mission 
design (teaming with NASA Goddard Space Flight 
Center (GSFC) and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
(JPL)), conduct mission and science operations, and 
design/develop the payload instrument suite while NG 
would design and build the innovative spacecraft bus. 
 
Fig. 1: The LCROSS Spacecraft 
 
If successful, the LCROSS mission (Fig.1) would 
conduct the first in-situ study of a pristine, permanently 
shadowed lunar crater and test for the presence of water 
ice in a permanently shadowed region, building on 
previous lunar missions, Clementine and Lunar 
Prospector. 
 
II. THE LCROSS SELECTION 
After a period of evaluation by ESMD and the 
Robotic Lunar Exploration Program (RLEP), LCROSS 
was selected in a somewhat dramatic “reveal” in 
Washington DC shortly before it was announced at a 
NASA press conference. Just prior to the television 
cameras going live, ESMD Associate Administrator 
(AA) Scott “Doc” Horowitz informed LCROSS Project 
Manager Dan Andrews that ESMD had a very focused 
purpose for LCROSS because it represented a type of 
mission that “is not your father’s NASA”. Horowitz 
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acknowledged that there was a place for the heft and 
conservatism of traditional NASA missions, primarily 
in manned spaceflight, but that the Agency also needed 
a way to accomplish tactical missions inexpensively, 
given the financial constraints facing future Agency 
budgets. In LCROSS, he saw an exciting mission, able 
to inspire the public by determining if water-ice is 
present on the Moon, while at the same time proving 
there is a cost-effective way to execute meaningful 
missions on a budget. 
Horowitz and Andrews later discussed how 
LCROSS could be a pathfinder project for the Agency’s 
ability to make practical use of excess launch capacity, 
while staying within tough cost & schedule constraints. 
Noting that the Agency would increasingly need to rely 
on smaller, high-leverage, cost-capped missions, 
Horowitz asked Andrews to track all that he learned in 
bringing LCROSS to a successful conclusion. This 
would include how well the NASA Policy 
Requirements (NPRs) served the project, the 
effectiveness of acquisition processes, and how the 
Program Office and Headquarters behaved with this 
unconventional project. Using the LCROSS mission as 
a prototype, Horowitz had a clear vision of how and 
where this type of mission would fit within the NASA 
portfolio. As he later stated in an interview, “I could 
triple the cost to try and guarantee no failure, or I could 
do three projects and even if one fails, I still get more 
done” 1. 
This key dialogue with the principal mission 
stakeholder established the context for what would 
make a successful LCROSS mission, i.e., cost and 
schedule were key drivers and risks could be taken. 
 
III. THE LCROSS SCIENCE BASIS 
The scientific basis for the LCROSS mission had 
roots in the Clementine (1994) and Lunar Prospector 
(1998) Missions which performed complementary forms 
of resource mapping. This mapping led the lunar 
science community to conclude that there might be 
water-ice trapped in permanently shadowed craters on 
the Moon2. Both of these missions were instrumental in 
the lunar ice question. In particular, the Lunar 
Prospector Mission (LP) neutron measurements 
indicated elevated hydrogen signatures in permanently-
shadowed craters on both the North and South poles of 
the Moon. In light of these data, the science community 
wondered if these elevated hydrogen signatures could 
be an indication of the presence of water-ice, trapped 
just beneath the regolith surface of the crater floors. 
 
IV. THE LCROSS MISSION 
LCROSS proposed to conduct a low-cost, fast-track 
companion mission to launch with LRO. The Atlas 
launch vehicle used for the LRO mission consists of a  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: The LRO/LCROSS Launch Vehicle Stack 
 
booster stage and the Centaur upper stage. The 
LCROSS spacecraft would be mounted atop the Centaur 
with the LRO spacecraft mounted atop LCROSS (Fig. 
2). 
With a mass constraint of 1000 Kg, LCROSS 
proposed to use the upper stage of the Atlas-V rocket 
(the “Centaur”), normally space junk after delivering a 
payload, to effectively triple the size of its working 
payload. By repurposing the spent Centaur to LCROSS, 
mission planners were able to stay within the 1000 Kg 
mass budget allotted to the secondary payload while 
gaining approximately 2300 Kg of mass “for free”. 
Proposing the use of the Centaur as a lunar kinetic 
impactor, LCROSS would “drop” the 2300 Kg rocket 
(about the weight of a large sports utility vehicle) into a 
permanently-shadowed crater, at a speed of 1.5 
miles/second (2.5 km/s) or three times the speed of a 
bullet, to kick-up a plume of material from the crater 
floor. The 1000 Kg LCROSS “Shepherding Spacecraft” 
would then collect and transmit data about the impact 
and plume back to LCROSS mission control using nine 
on-board science instruments before impacting the 
surface itself, about 4 minutes after the Centaur. 
On June 18, 2009, LCROSS and LRO launched 
aboard an Atlas V rocket from Cape Canaveral, in 
Florida, USA. Once the Atlas V achieved the LRO lunar 
insertion requirement, LRO separated, enabling it to 
independently move forward on its mission, leaving 
LCROSS and the still-attached Centaur behind. The 
Centaur then performed a series of venting maneuvers 
to eliminate gasses which could contaminate the lunar 
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impact measurement. The Centaur then became an inert, 
empty vessel and an official part of the LCROSS 
mission. Approximately five days after launch, 
LCROSS entered into an extended Lunar Gravity-
Assist, Lunar Return Orbit (LGALRO) by performing a 
lunar-swing-by of the moon. The cruise phase of the 
mission lasted slightly more than 100 days before 
entering into the terminal phase of the mission. In the 
meantime, LCROSS’ long, high-inclination orbit around 
the Earth gave the LRO mission time to commission its 
instruments and collect data about the South Pole craters 
to help the LCROSS science team refine target crater 
selection. In fact, this LRO data led to LCROSS 
changing the impact crater from Cabeus-A to Cabeus. 
Cabeus had more relevant conditions related to the 
fundamental water question, but was a much deeper 
crater. Although it was known that this crater change 
would negatively impact Earth observations, it was the 
scientifically proper strategy for the mission because the 
first priority of the LCROSS PM and science team was 
to assure scientific relevance. 
During the cruise phase, LCROSS maintained its 
Earth cruise orbit by executing several Trajectory 
Correction Maneuvers (TCMs) to provide for the final 
lunar approach required to position the Centaur for its 
ballistic lunar impact. Following the final TCM, the 
Centaur and the Shepherding Spacecraft separated about 
nine hours before impact (Fig. 3) followed by the 
Shepherding Spacecraft performing a braking maneuver 
to enable the release Centaur to impact the Moon first. 
This delay provided time for the Shepherding spacecraft  
 
 
Fig. 3: LCROSS Separating from Centaur 
 
 
Fig. 4: LCROSS Impact Plume 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5: LCROSS Centaur Impact Crater 
 
 
to observe the ejecta plume arising from the Centaur 
impact. The Centaur’s impact is estimated to have 
excavated 250-350 metric tons of regolith, leaving an 
impact crater approximately 82 feet (25 m) in diameter. 
LCROSS thermal images of the ejecta plume 
development and the resultant Centaur crater as seen by 
the LCROSS NIR camera while 14km above the crater 
floor, can be seen in Fig. 4 and the resultant Centaur 
impact crater in Fig. 5 3. 
LCROSS discovered that regolith in this 
permanently shadowed crater was very fine with a talc-
like consistency. Much of the kinetic energy of the 
Centaur impact was converted into thermal energy into 
the local soil creating a notable vapor cloud. Less 
energy went into rock and dirt ejecta being thrown 
upward given the nature of the crater floor regolith. As 
the Shepherding Spacecraft continued its delayed 
decent, cameras and sensors in the instrument suite were 
able to measure the constituents of the Centaur ejecta 
plume, observing and measuring all the way down to the 
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inevitable second impact on the Moon four minutes 
later. The sensors on LRO were able to make notable 
measurements of the nature of the ejecta and impact 
plume, providing excellent complementary data on the 
LCROSS impact. 
 
V. THE LCROSS PAYLOAD INSTRUMENTS 
The LCROSS instrument payload was designed to 
provide mission scientists with multiple complimentary 
views of the debris plume created by the Centaur 
impact. The instrument suite consisted of nine 
instruments: one visible, two near-infrared and two mid-
infrared cameras; one visible and two near-infrared 
spectrometers; and a photometer - all optimized to 
answer the fundamental question about water ice. 
These instruments were selected to be low-cost, 
rugged, commercially available components for an 
Earth environment. However, to ensure survival in both 
space and launch environments, the LCROSS payload 
team needed to put the individual instruments though 
rigorous testing to simulate launch and the conditions in 
space. When that testing revealed weaknesses, the team 
worked with the manufacturers to strengthen their 
designs for satisfactory use in the LCROSS mission. 
 
VI. LCROSS AS A CLASS D MISSION 
A key enabling factor for LCROSS success was its 
designation by the ESMD Associate Administrator as a 
risk-tolerant Class D mission. NASA classifies all 
spaceflight missions into one of four categories based 
on risk tolerance: Class A, B, C, and D. This 
classification system has origins in the Department of 
Defense (DoD) Military Standards (Mil-STDS) 
documents which NASA has tailored into a Safety and 
Mission Assurance (S&MA) NASA Procedural 
Requirement (NPR 8705.4) 4. 
Class D missions are the most risk-tolerant missions 
in NASA. While safety concerns are treated no 
differently for a Class D mission than a Class A 
mission, Class D missions are allowed to be “single 
strung”, which means there is no redundancy required. 
In fact, as it states in NPR 8705.4, “Medium or 
significant risk of not achieving mission success is 
permitted”, so this type of mission can fail. Class D 
designation is typically applied to small missions that 
are constrained in some way making it harder to assure 
mission success. For LCROSS, the Agency Class D 
designation was in place to improve the likelihood it 
could make the LRO launch date, within budget. 
When LCROSS was cast as a Class D mission, 
technical risk officially became part of the mission trade 
space. Because the mission was cost-capped, cost 
maintenance was essential. The Project cost cap had to 
be maintained even if at the expense of technical 
requirements as the mission could be cancelled if the 
cost cap was exceeded. LCROSS was also schedule-
constrained since it had to make the LRO launch date. 
As a result, LCROSS was permitted to waive 
performance requirements or take additional risk as 
necessary to fit into the schedule and cost constraints. 
Managing the mission success risk for LCROSS 
involved management of the three traditional elements – 
cost, schedule, and technical capabilities. Because cost 
and schedule were constrained, technical capability was 
really the only element that could be actively managed.  
 
Cost Risk + Schedule Risk + Technical Risk = Mission Risk 
 
Although LCROSS had a Class D mission 
designation allowing a higher-than-normal mission risk, 
it was in everyone’s interest to keep that risk as low as 
possible to increase the chances of success. By 
definition then, the technical capability risk also had to 
be kept as low as possible, primarily by keeping the 
complexity level as low as possible 5. 
 
VI.I Capabilities-Driven Missions Lower Risk 
Keeping that technical risk in check meant the 
LCROSS mission was not about pushing the limits of 
technology and performance. This particular mission 
was about doing as much as possible within existing 
capabilities of the system. Capability-driven missions 
like LCROSS are exactly what the name implies: 
working to achieve requirements by staying as much as 
possible within the capabilities of the system. This is 
very different than many science-driven NASA 
missions where needed capabilities are defined and then 
efforts to meet them are defined to meet the mission 
requirements. That approach is too open-ended and can 
involve a full development and test cycle which is 
fraught with risk and can be costly in schedule 
consumption. LCROSS was a Design-to-Cost 6 project, 
working within cost and schedule constraints that were 
the principal drivers for the project. By working as 
much as possible with existing designs, LCROSS had a 
set of proven capabilities that helped to contain cost and 
schedule. 
The perfect incarnation of a capability-driven project 
requires little to no modifications over what has been 
done before. Everything is not only flight-proven, but 
proven in the identical arrangement and configuration of 
how it will be used on the project. Clearly, this scenario 
is not typical, so a real Design-to-Cost project needs to 
carry sufficient risk margins for not only the unknowns, 
but for the inevitable effort required to address the risk 
associated with expanding capabilities where required. 
Of course, requirements descope is always an option as 
it effectively designs in technical risk margin to 
accommodate more mass or power needs as the project 
evolves. 
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VI.II “Glue Missions” Lower Risk 
By using and “gluing together” already-proven 
hardware, software, and Integration & Test (I&T) 
approaches, the residual technical risk for LCROSS 
resided primarily in the design effort of “gluing” the 
components together, as well as general component 
workmanship issues which are always present. In 
addition to lowering technical risk, “Glue Missions” 
also tend to keep cost and schedule risk in check 
because the simplicity and heritage extensibility makes 
it less likely extra time and money will be needed to 
remediate a problem. 
 
VII. MANAGING LCROSS REQUIREMENTS 
Given the LCROSS mission success equation with 
its cost-and-schedule constraints, managing technical 
capabilities in the form of project requirements became 
even more important. LCROSS project requirements 
defined the critical performance metrics of the mission 
as well as the previously mentioned success criteria. 
Although the LCROSS minimum success criteria 
required no performance from the payload at all, the 
spacecraft pointing performance was still required to 
meet the minimum mission success requirements of 
directing the Centaur into the chosen crater, so those 
requirements were primary. Secondary requirements 
were those that would achieve Full Mission Success for 
LCROSS. Secondary requirements necessarily involved 
the payload instruments because Full Success Criteria 
required the LCROSS spacecraft to perform in-situ 
measurements determining the presence and quantity of 
water-ice. Tertiary requirements, then, were those that 
would be interesting to have, but not required for 
achieving primary or secondary success criteria. 
Thus, the LCROSS mission requirements could be 
categorized as follows: 
Minimum (primary) Success Requirements - needed 
 to assure the impactor is sent into a targeted, 
 permanently shadowed crater. 
Full (secondary) Success Requirements - needed to 
 assure the impactor is sent into a targeted, 
 permanently shadowed crater, and the LCROSS 
 spacecraft is able to make in-situ water-ice 
 measurements of the ejecta plume.  
Extended Full (tertiary) Success Requirements – 
 needed to assure the impactor is sent into a targeted, 
 permanently shadowed crater, and the LCROSS 
 spacecraft is able to make in-situ water-ice 
 measurements of the ejecta plume and make other 
 interesting measurements related to the ejecta plume. 
 
By prioritizing requirements in this manner, 
requirements could be cut from the third category, and 
possibly the second without endangering mission 
success, should the need arise. For example, if it were 
determined that the LCROSS Shepherding Spacecraft 
could not be separated from the Centaur on orbit, all 
requirements from the second and third categories 
would be eliminated because the payload instruments 
would become part of the Centaur impact. However, the 
mission would still be considered a success even if the 
entire stack was crashed into the Moon, as long as the 
Minimum Success Requirements were met and impact 
took place in a targeted, permanently shadowed crater. 
 
VIII. LESSONS LEARNED 
When LCROSS successfully passed its 
Confirmation Review in which the Project was 
officially green-lighted to be a flight mission, the 
LCROSS Project Manager provided a courtesy outbrief 
to the ESMD Associate Administrator, Scott “Doc” 
Horowitz. The outbrief discussed LCROSS scope, 
approaches, and plans. Very interested in the execution 
of this novel mission, Horowitz made the following  
request of the LCROSS team in front of his executive 
staff: 
“I want you to take lots of notes as you go through 
the mission and come back here and brief me on what 
you’ve learned over the course of LCROSS. I think there 
will be much that can be applied even to Class A 
missions.” 
Although Horowitz was no longer the AA for 
ESMD when the mission struck the moon in 2009,the 
LCROSS Team honored their commitment and briefed 
ESMD with the following series of top “Lessons-
Learned” which were culled from the hundreds 
collected and officially submitted to The Agency Office 
of Chief Engineer. 
 
VIII.I LESSON: Embed Mission Operations System 
(MOS) Staff in Spacecraft Testing 
The LCROSS cost-capped mission did not have the 
budget for a shadow MOS team to be available 
throughout project development that could then fly the 
mission and develop all the requisite products required 
during development. So a novel approach was 
formulated to make use of embedded NASA engineers 
at Northrop-Grumman. The first NASA engineer was 
embeded with Northrop-Grumman during LCROSS 
spacecraft “FlatSat” testing, when all the avionics were 
connected together and tested with the flight software. 
This “Liaison Engineer” did not simply observe 
activities as if in a mission assurance role. He was there 
to truly embed with the technical work doing early 
verification of the flight software and avionics. This 
approach proved to be so effective that the Liaison 
Engineer started writing scripts and executing them as a 
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full member of the team, quickly garnering full trust and 
even accolades from the NG team. 
The same approach was taken later in the project 
when LCROSS entered into spacecraft Integration & 
Test (I&T) and embedded another NASA engineer with 
the NG team. This engineer also got closely involved in 
the verification activities, and in doing so, was able to 
participate in the resolution of integration issues and 
witness the emerging  “personality” of the spacecraft. 
While this embedding clearly benefitted the 
LCROSS Project Manager and Project Systems 
Engineer by providing a virtual presence in the I&T 
activities, it also proved to have other benefits when the 
two embedded engineers became the Flight Controllers 
for the LCROSS mission. These NASA engineers 
became the people who issued all commands to the 
spacecraft and had some of the best understanding of 
that spacecraft’s behavior. Also, when anomalous 
events did occur, the experience these engineers gained 
by being embedded with the NG team brought valuable 
insight to discussion of those anomalies. Of course, the 
NASA LCROSS Ops team had employed NG in a 
“back room” capacity for monitoring the spacecraft, but 
having that first-hand knowledge available in the 
Mission Ops Control Room proved to be invaluable. 
The lesson here is to carefully consider the best 
application of embedding staff, within existing budget 
constraints. If there are sufficient funds, then a very 
large MOS team shadowing S/C I&T may be an option. 
If not, then the careful, thrifty application of skills in the 
mix of activities can still be very helpful. 
 
VIII.II LESSON: Have Technical Freeboard 
Somewhere 
LCROSS was cast as a Class D mission, which 
means it can accept more technical risk than other 
mission types in NASA. So why have “freeboard”, 
a.k.a. extra technical margin? As noted earlier, one of 
the ways that LCROSS kept its risk in check was by 
keeping complexity as low as possible while satisfying 
project requirements. To address the remaining 
complexity in the design, having technical performance 
measures which have a fair amount of margin could be 
invaluable. This extra margin is a commodity that can 
be used in many different and sometimes unplanned 
ways during the mission. Extra fuel, power, thermal, or 
RF link can provide operational degrees of freedom 
when anomalies are encountered. 
LCROSS had “freeboard” margin with its power 
system. The LCROSS solar array was electrically “hot”, 
meaning it generated much more power than was 
actually needed to execute the mission. As a result, 
LCROSS could point as much as 60 degrees off of sun 
before the power generated by the system was 
insufficient, or “power negative”. This freeboard on 
electrical power meant not only that the mission could 
consume more power than planned; it could also be 
used as an added resource to handle emergencies. 
For example, on orbit it was discovered that two of 
the thruster propellant lines were getting sufficiently 
cold to be dangerously close to freezing the propellant 
in the lines, thereby running the risk of a line breach. 
The root cause of this proved to be related to the 
location of the heater thermostats. The mitigation option 
would be to consider re-writing the flight software to 
trigger the heaters earlier based on thermister feedback, 
but flight software changes are very dangerous as they 
break systems verification which can result in 
unintended consequences elsewhere in the code. Having 
a power “freeboard”, however, meant that instead of 
changing the flight software code, LCROSS could 
tolerate being pointed a fair amount off sun, using the 
sun to heat the thrusters and lines directly. This was 
accomplished by yawing spacecraft 20[deg] toward the 
sun which effectively raised the rear thrusters out from 
behind the shadow of the spacecraft, exposing them 
directly to the sun’s heat. .Although this maneuver 
caused the solar array to no longer be pointing directly 
at the sun, the existence of the LCROSS power 
“freeboard” still meant there were still sufficient power 
resources for the mission. Additionally, LCROSS had 
plenty of battery capacity onboard which meant that the 
hot solar array could store more energy for use in 
failsafe scenarios where the spacecraft is put into a non-
solar facing “drift” state, allowing it to go power-
negative to preserve propellant. Having that extra power 
capacity meant the spacecraft could be in such a state 
for longer periods of time, providing a more robust 
recovery. 
Another LCROSS “freeboard” area was with its fuel 
margin. This margin was a product of having made use 
of an existing tank size which was larger than needed 
for the mission, but was available (recall the importance 
of capabilities-driven). This extra capacity proved its 
worth at least twice during the mission. In one case, the 
Centaur fill/drain valves leaked more than anticipated 
and represented a disturbance force to LCROSS which 
consumed more propellant to offset. In another case, an 
on-orbit anomaly caused excessive firing of the 
LCROSS thrusters which consumed considerably more 
propellant than planned.. In each of these cases, having 
the freeboard on fuel reserves helped the mission 
survive. 
 
VIII.III LESSON: TTAYF: Test/Train As You Fly 
The mantras, “Test, Test, Test” and, “Train, Train, 
Train” are good policies because they are the best way 
to understand both the capabilities and limits of the 
spacecraft and of the team. Unfortunately, these labor 
and facility-intensive activities may consume a great 
deal of financial resources – the cost-capped project’s 
most precious commodity. TTAYF was employed on 
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LCROSS to attempt to strike a balance between the 
value of testing and training and the cost of doing so. As 
a result, LCROSS had to focus on the most meaningful 
and relevant performance of both the hardware and the 
people.  
Test As You Fly verifies spacecraft functionality in 
the ways it will be required to perform on orbit. 
LCROSS could not perform a full suite of qualification 
testing due to cost constraints, but still needed to ensure 
that the basic mission was viable. Qualification testing 
for off-nominal anomaly-handling although nice to have 
would have to be addressed by the Ops team when 
anomalies actually surfaced. 
Train As You Fly verifies that the Ops team can 
handle the actual nominal activities of the mission. This 
training was done first with “Engineering Readiness 
Tests” (ERTs), and then later with “Operational 
Readiness Tests” (ORTs). ERTs required all operational 
functionality be in place to fly the mission (telemetry, 
commanding, ground station connectivity operator 
screens complete, etc), but was not conducted in real 
time. ORTs were the exact same thing, but conducted in 
real time. In fact, they were not only conducted in real 
time duration, but at the real time of the day, so that the 
team could experience carrying a shift in the middle of 
the night when they might be tired and hungry. The 
value of the ERTs was that it revealed any technical or 
procedural flaws with the plan and could be adapted as 
needed to make sure everything was feasible. The value 
of the ORTs was that staff had to endure real-time 
decision-making and mission stress, revealing 
weaknesses with a small team. Further, during the 
ORTs, the Test Conductor, who did not have an official 
console position, would “throw sticks in the spokes” of 
the operations folks to test their responsiveness. At the 
end of an ORT, the Test Conductor would discuss all he 
did to the team, and most importantly, evaluate how 
quickly they were able to see anomalies he introduced, 
and in some cases, minor anomalies they never saw. 
The Test Conductor addition to the ORTs cost only one 
additional FTE and proved to be invaluable. It was 
common during an ORT for the spacecraft to lose an 
Inertial Reference Unit (IRU), or the telemetry would 
grow stale due to a lost ground station link, or a console 
location would lose power, etc, etc. The team treated 
these ORT exercises very seriously as if they were 
actually flying a spacecraft. Further, since ORTs are run 
in real time, the operation crew had to react in a timely 
manner, noting things like a communication pass about 
to expire and having to deal with potential declaration 
of emergency to get more time to safe the spacecraft. 
The operations team definitely benefitted from this type 
of training when the real mission was flown and real 
anomalies were experienced. 
 
VIII.IV LESSON: NASA Policy Documents Do Not 
Cross-Cut Mission Class 
The lesson only applies to NASA missions, but it is 
a critical one. As discussed earlier, the whole Class D 
premise comes from a NASA Policy Requirement 
called NPR 8705.4. This document defines, in 
somewhat vague terms, what it means to be a Class A, 
B, C, or D mission. LCROSS’ approaches with Class D 
were based in this NPR, and similar NG policy 
documents. 
NPR 8705.4 is helpful in providing a construct, but 
is somewhat vague, which gives projects and 
stakeholders some room to tailor their activities – a 
good thing; however, where the problem surfaces is 
with the many other NASA Policy Requirements which 
do not address mission class at all. Good examples are 
NPR 7120.5 which is the Policy document covering the 
management of projects and programs, and NPR 7123.1 
which is the Agency’s Systems Engineering NPR 
defining technical performance requirements. These two 
NPRs are critical, foundational NPRs which the 
stakeholders use to assure that the NASA project is 
executing to the defined standards of the Agency. The 
problem of course is that these NPRs apply to missions 
of all costs, sizes, importance levels, and yes, mission 
class. Without separate delineation of mission class in 
these foundational requirements documents, small team 
Class D projects are carrying the same requirements as 
much larger Flagship missions. There is the ability to 
waive requirements, but the process of waiving 
necessarily comes with the burden of advocating, 
explaining, and defending the waiver. Unintentionally, 
these one-size-fits-all rules encumber the small team 
with adjudication efforts of the stakeholders. 
Classification of a mission as “D” is put in place to 
help it be successful with programmatic constraints, but 
the reality is that the small team finds itself in the 
position of having to define/justify Class D activities to 
multiple stakeholder parties of different views – making 
more work for the team. The Agency is thus advised to 
consider creating a lightweight pathway for small 
satellite / small-team missions which is not overly 
prescriptive, but offers requirements options that can 
achieve lower project overhead. 
 
VIII.V LESSON: Risk Tolerant Missions Require Good 
Risk Management 
Perhaps the most important lesson learned by the 
LCROSS team was that even risk-tolerant missions 
need to employ good risk management practices to be 
successful.  
Given the cost constraints of mission, LCROSS 
could not afford to eliminate risk – a goal more 
appropriately associated with Class A missions where 
people’s lives hang in the balance.  For Class D 
missions like LCROSS, there is simply not enough time 
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or money. So if the LCROSS team could not eliminate 
risk, what risks should be mitigated and what risks left 
alone? It became apparent that LCROSS required very 
careful risk management specifically because it could 
accept elevated levels of technical risk. LCROSS Risk 
Management Boards (RMBs) had to study risk 
impact/likelihood and carefully trade risks against each 
other. Although initially thought to be a tedious, long, 
and encumbering process, RMBs were ultimately seen 
by the LCROSS team as having great importance. They 
were never fun, but the team leads were always good 
with their attendance because they knew they had to 
strike a balance to meet their own schedule and cost 
objectives. 
An interesting example of this, which occurred in 
many RMBs, was when a risk mitigation discussion led 
to not executing a mitigation. During a discussion of a 
payload instrument risk, the engineering team was 
discussing ways to mitigate the risk with this change or 
that, adding heaters or making some aspect redundant, 
etc. when they realized that the risk under discussion 
was being driven lower than the composite spacecraft 
risk, i.e., they were assuring the payload was less likely 
to experience a failure than the spacecraft that was 
carrying it! This was when the team really understood 
what it meant to be Class D. It meant having a sufficient 
understanding of the risks to know when to not mitigate 
and, instead, liquidate, i.e. save the mitigation money 
and schedule for other purposes. This approach is not 
easy, but if cost/schedule are independent variables, 
technical risk needs to managed as the dependent 
variable. 
 
VIII.VI LESSON: Stable Stakeholder Requirements Are 
Essential 
LCROSS was “decommissioned” with the same 
requirements set in which it was initiated. Period. The 
LCROSS team benefitted from having a stakeholder 
community that was willing to establish a set of 
requirements they could stand behind and not change. It 
is difficult to explain how important this is to the 
executing team. There are many examples, both inside 
and outside the Agency, where requirements creep by 
the stakeholders becomes the undoing of the project, 
leading to its ultimate failure in requirements, schedule 
and/or budget. Requirements creep usually manifests 
itself by a multitude of “minor change requests” that 
slowly disrupt the team’s focus and eventually lead to 
some systems engineering difficulties. 
Stable requirements are essential to minimize 
perturbations to the team momentum. An example came 
early in the LCROSS mission prior to the Preliminary 
Design Review (PDR). The LCROSS PM was 
approached by a senior stakeholder asking to add the 
capability of two wireless routers from a local high-tech 
firm to the mission, along with accompanying wireless 
cameras to be able to demonstrate the first use of 
wireless routers in space. Although an enticing idea at 
first, (who wouldn’t want to do this!) the team 
conducted an investigation on what such an 
implementation would involve and found that while this 
was not a big tax on any single performance metric, it 
was a small tax on nearly every performance metric. 
Everything from mass, to volume, to power, to thermal, 
to flight worthiness, to testing, etc was affected. This 
“small change”, even pre-PDR was not only going to 
change most everything, it would consume “freeboard 
margins”.  Further, it crossed ownership lines since one 
of these units would have to fly on the Centuar, thereby 
involving the launch provider’s design as well, changing 
Interface Control Documents (ICDs) growing system 
complexity. This was a mess. This genuinely clever idea 
that the team actually wanted to implement, was 
growing the project risk substantially, distracting the 
team from the core project objectives. To the 
stakeholder’s credit, they were able to back away from 
this request. 
 
VIII.VII LESSON: Be Decisive 
As noted, the LCROSS Project had an aggressive 
schedule, so it was essential to be decisive when pivotal 
project decisions were required. This can make 
engineers nervous because it often means that decisions 
must be made before all the information is available. 
The LCROSS team found that if they could achieve 
~80% confidence on a decisive topic, it was time to 
make that call and move on. Good engineering 
judgment will assure that most of those decisions are the 
right ones, but perhaps even more interesting when they 
are not. The team evaluated the trade of the time 
associated with changing course (corrective action after 
the fact) versus having studied the original decision 
further and delaying that original decision. Which is the 
right way to go? The LCROSS team discovered two 
principles: 
 
! The odds of making wise decisions in the 
first place are improved by keeping the 
design simple. The simpler the system, the 
easier it is to make good judgments about 
the proper way forward. 
 
! In the choice between making a responsive 
decision that needs changing later versus 
waiting for 100% confidence prior to 
making a decision, it is better to make a 
decision and adjust course later. The time 
spent seeking perfect understanding is 
usually longer than the time of corrective 
action. 
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VIII.VII LESSON: Watch Out for that Last 10% of 
Performance 
Augustine's Law #15: “The last 10 percent of 
performance generates one-third of the cost and two-
thirds of the problems” 7.  
This premise was very much on the minds of the 
technical and programmatic team on the LCROSS 
Project. As discussed earlier, the team even experienced 
this with the requirements creep request for adding a 
wireless router and cameras to the mission prior to PDR. 
This was not pushing the state of the art very hard and 
on the surface appeared a small step forward; but when 
it was studied closer, such a change affected nearly 
every technical aspect of the spacecraft design, and even 
that of the launch vehicle. While technology was not 
being stretched too far, the degree to which the system 
design, systems test, systems verification, and mission 
operations was affected was notable. 
Early in this mission, a wise person stated, “This 
mission is not about maximum performance, but about 
cost containment” 8. This is another angle on the same 
lesson. Design the mission to fit within existing 
capabilities everywhere you can, and then live within 
those capabilities. 
 
IX. LCROSS PROGRAMMATIC SUMMARY 
The key to capabilities-driven, cost-capped missions 
like LCROSS is to keep it simple and to manage the risk 
equation. It is not about eliminating risk, which is very 
costly. It is about managing risk to a level 
commensurate with project programmatic constraints. 
LCROSS did this by making use of existing investments 
by the Agency, existing commercial hardware, and 
being sufficiently creative to see opportunities to buy-
down risk.   
Ultimately, LCROSS succeeded because the 
individuals and organizations in the LCROSS team 
walked a shared road on a mission to the Moon and 
worked together to make it succeed. Each party on this 
team had both mutual and self-interests for why they 
wanted to participate. The Agency wanted to show that 
there was an effective way to make use of excess launch 
capability and to work cheaply; NASA ARC wanted to 
show it was able to run small, fast-paced, lightweight 
missions; NG wanted to show that it could be nimble 
and carve out a new market for itself; and the 
commercial sector found an onramp to space and lunar 
applications which could propel their businesses into a 
new market. One of the great successes of LCROSS was 
aligning each the team member’s needs into a common 
purpose which benefited everyone in a win-win-win 
scenario. 
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